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The sea hathfishfoT every man.
-William Camden, Remains Concerning Britain
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Introduction

Human existence bas always required the consumption of renewable resources.
Although man may not live on bread alone, without food be cannot survive long. When
the fields die, the farmers move. When the herd migrates, the tribe follows.

In a lucid moment betraying its pop-culture roots, The Matrix outlined the
problem society faces now:

Every mammal on this planet instinctively develops a natural equilibrium
with the surrounding environment. But you humans do not. You move 10
an area and you multiply and multiply until every natural resource is
consumed and the only way you can survive ;s to spread 10 another area.

The world population recently topped 6 billion people. Each person has the same need to
eat, breathe, and drink.
Unfortunately the world's limited resources imply a carrying capacity for the
human race. As we approach this critical mass, the strain on our resources becomes
increasingly sev·ere.
We have already begun to realize such disasters. Many of the world's fisheries
have been destroyed, depleted to near nonexistence, or critically overfished. In some
cases they only held on because the price of catching the final fish outweighed the
potential revenue from catching it.
This paper is an attempt to increase our understanding of the interaction between
the economic motivations and biological forces at work in fisheries so that we may better
preserve current stocks and help prevent future ecological devastation. More specifically,
I seek to understand the decisions of fishermen in response to the price and stock offish.
The basis for my work is "Backward Boycotts: Demand Management and Fishery
Conservation", by 1. Samuel Barkin and KashifMansori, who argue that the supply curve
for a fishery may downward sloping or be S-shaped. This paper is divided into the
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following sections: I. Basic Fishery Economics; II. Relevant Literature; III. Derivation of
the Model: Assumptions; IV. Proof that the Supply Curve is Backwards Bending; V.
Derivation of the Model: Deriving a System of Equations; VI. Derivation of Parameters
for System of Equations; VII. The Resulting Model; vrn. Dynamic Shifts; IX.
Conclusion; X. Maple Appendix.)

1 The Maplefiles have been converted. to text file format and most outputs have been deleted for
simplicity.
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I.

Basic Fishery Economics

In the past half century, consumption offish has nearly doubled. The Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported that 95m tons offish were landed in 2000,
seemingly the highest catch ever. However this number may be inflated, thanks to
inaccurate reporting. It is suspected that the yearly catch has declined since the 19805, a
result of almost 75% of the world's fisheries being depleted. 2
Fisheries are interactive resources: they are subject to harvesting, which depletes
their stock, and biological factors, by which nature generally attempts to increase the
stock. Left to nature's influences, fishery populations approach a biological carrying
capacity over time. Generally this is modeled as a logistic curve where the rate of fish
growth reaches a maximum somewhere in between zero stock and maximum stock. The
stock's highest rate of growth is also its maximum sustainable yield. If fishermen remove
exactly as many fish as are bred into the environment each year, then the total catch will
be the largest that can be continued perpetually. A stock size above or below the MSY
decreases the rate of growth. There may even be a minimum quantity of stock below
which the growth rate is negative, perhaps because the population's density is low
enough to keep fish from the actual act of reproduction. This is the basis of the Schaefer
model of the fishery: there is a relationship between the stock of fish and the growth rate
of the stock.
This is shown in Figure 1.1, where

Smin

represents the minimum sustainable

stock, S· is the stock at the MSY, Smax is the maximum sustainable stock. 3

"Special Fishing Report," pg. 19
For further discussion of fishery economics, see Tom Tietenberg, Environmental Economics & Policy,
pg.s 221-239

2
1
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Figure 1.1
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Fishermen have conflicting motives when deciding how much to fish. On one
hand they want to maximize the discounted sum of the present and future net benefits
from a fishery. Barring unusual circumstances, such as an infinite discount rate, their
general inclination is to fish at the MSY, should price be held constant for changes in the
quantity supplied. This would produce a dynamic equilibrium.
However, in an open-access fishery, like in any other industry, economic profits
encourage competition. Since a fisherman cannot control the actions of the other
fishermen, he cannot ensure a future stock offish, he develops an incentive to fish more

in the present. Instead of maximizing his net benefits from fishing, he drives rent down to
zero where all fishermen realize economic profits. This is a manifestation of the problem
of the commons. The individual has an incentive to engage in behavior that is harmful to
society as a whole. In the case of fishing, the incentive to overfish can lead to lower
future fish harvests or permanently destroy the fishery.
We can see this conflict in Figure 1.2. If the marginal cost is constant as fishing
effort increases then the Total Cost function is a straight line. The Total Benefit curve
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declines as effort increases because this model assumes sustainability into the future and
constancy in effort. Thus, when effort has driven the catch passed the MSY, future
harvests will decrease, decreasing the present value of those harvests. 4 Clearly,
fishermen have the greatest surplus at Ee' where their effort matches the slope of the
Total Cost curve to the slope of the Total Benefit curve. However, as described, open
access competition will push effort to where the IB and TC curves intersect, at E c .
Thus, static efficiency and dynamic efficiency conflict in a competitive fishery.

Figure 1.2
$ Total
Benefits!
Total
Costs

Tangent

Fishing
Effort

There are two types of economic extemaJities created here. The contemporaneous
externality, the overcommitment of resources to fishing, affects the current generation.
That is, resources being used for fishing could benefit society more ifused elsewhere.
The intergenerational externality is the effect on future generations of a lower stock due
to overfishing. This includes smaller future harvests and, in general, a lower discounted
present value for use of the fishery.

4

Here I am assuming that the discount rate of future goods is not large enough to interfere.
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Possible responses to the problems of the fishery include aquaculture, fish
farming, regulating equipment, taxes, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and boycotts
and other attempts to change consumer demand. Aquaculture, or fish fanning, is the
practice of making the resource privately owned. Fish farmers generally work a stock
that is artificially enclosed by fences. Since the incentive to overfish only occurs when
market entry eliminates the gains from preserving the stock, a privately owned fishery
should generally seek to operate at an efficient rate ofbarvest. Equipment regulation
(such as forbidding the use of certain technologies) increases the cost of fishing, which
reduces the catch, but clearly works to also decrease efficiency. Attempts to lower
consumer demand assume that if the demand CUIVe drops, then the equilibrium price will
drop, and fewer fish will be supplied. ITQs work by encouraging fishermen to remove
their quota of fish as efficiently as possible. The quotas are set so as to maintain or
increase the stock of fish. 56
Each regulation makes certain assumptions about fishery economics. For
instance, regulations and practices that affect the demand curve, such as aquaculture or
boycotts, assume

aJ1l

upward sloping supply cwve. My model addresses this particular

assumption by assuming a backwards bending, or downward sloping, supply cwve. In
short, the model can evaluate the effects of different economic assumptions on the
effectiveness of regulations.

Tietenberg, Emironmental Economics & Policy, pg.s 227-237.
For a review of mathematics and economics associated with renewable resource analysis, see Frederick
M. Peterson and Anthony C. Fisher, ''The Exploitation of Extractive Resources: A Survey."
5
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u.
Relevant Literature

"Backward Boycotts: Demand Management and Fishery Conservation" by J.
Samuel Barkin and KashifMansori serves as my point of departure. It concludes that the
supply curve for Northeastern fisheries "show characteristics of a backward-bending
supply curve." 7 Barkin and Mansori analyzed the elasticity of supply and demand using
data from the New England Fishery. The elasticity of demand was consistently normal
(negative) and significant at the 99% level. Their data suggested an. elasticity of -2.6.
However, the elasticity of supply was found to be -1, suggesting that the supply curve
also slopes downward, instead of upwards as is conventionally assumed.
They explained these results by suggesting that fishermen have basic financial
needs that must be met with their fishing income. When the price drops significantly,
instead of exiting the market or decreasing the quantity supplied, fishermen actually fish
more so as to meet their financial obligations.
The same phenomenon has been noted in labor markets in general. When wages
drop far enough, workers actually work more hours so as to meet their minimum
financial needs.
Fishermen have a number of poss~ble motivations for such behavior. First, if
boats are bought on borrowed money then fishermen need some level of revenue to make
the interest payments. Next., barriers to exit and re-entry encourage fishermen to avoid
leaving the industry. Even the cultural attachment to fishing is an incentive to remain in
the industry.
Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of a conventional demand shock and
Figure 2.2 shows the same shock with a backward bending supply curve. As you can see
from Figure 2.2, demand policies actually encourage further overfishing if the demand
curve is backward bending. 8

7

S

Barkin and Manson, "Backward Boycotts: Demand Management and Fishery Conservation," pg.s 30-41.
Ibid.
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The result is that attempts to control demand may be an ineffective, and
potentially harmful, means of influencing a fishery. These attempts include anything that
seeks to reduce consumer demand and thereby reduce the quantity of fish supplied, such
as consumer boycotts or aquaculture. 9
Conventional demand policies assume a standard upward sloping supply curve.
Thus, when a policy encourages people to eat less fish, the demand curve should drop.
However, if the supply curve is S-shaped, as in Figure 2.2, decreased demand increases
the quantity supplied, and the policy is accomplishes the opposite of what was intended.

On the other hand, supply-side policies, such as ITQs, will be effective. IO

9

I refer to such actions as "demand policies."
Ibid.
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One interesting point arises when this logic is applied to the Schaefer model. A
fisherman will only increase effort when the marginal cost of the effort is still below the
marginal benefit of effort. For the fisherman to increase effort when revenue per fish
falls, he would need to be originally using an inefficiently low amount of effort. In
theory, he already could have been making more profit by using more effort, and
therefore should not have needed a price drop to motivate him to increase his effort.
I reconcile this by considering that the fisherman is interested in consuming more
than one activity. While work provides revenue, he will only work until the marginal
utility from income equals the marginal utility from other activities, like leisure. We can
suppose that the risk of being forced out of the industry from a price drop creates an
unusual circumstance that increases the marginal utility of income.
In my model price is endogenous to reflect the possibility that the amount of
fishing affects the price. Since Barkin and Mansori surveyed real-world data, they
simply observed price as it responded to a variety of factors.
Colin Clark's book, Mathmatical Bioeconomics, is the most comprehensive use of
differential equations and advanced non-econometric mathematics to study renewable
resources. I I The beginning ofms work is a mathematical discussion of the economics
discussed in I. He then considers several different dynamic fishery models.
Only in one case does he consider a backward bending supply curve. He
motivates it by considering the biological overfishing that occurs when the harvest rate
surpasses the maximum sustainable yield. In this case, not counting the first period of
increased effort, any sustained harvest beyond the MSY must be lower than the MSY.
Thus, as price increases, and effort increases correspondingly, the supply curve bends
backwards once the yield passes the MSY. Note that Clark's model assumes a constant
level of fishing effort into the future. Otherwise harvests above the MSY could be
obtained for several periods by simply depleting the stock of fish.
However, in my model I do not assume a sustainable harvest is created at each
price. This allows me to examine factors that can cause the stock to be driven to zero over
time as the price is kept from varying. Furthennore, the backward bending effect in my
supply cwve is motivated by the economic choices of fishermen, not the biological
II

Clark, MOlhemolicol Bioeconomics, pg.s 153-155.
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constraints of fishery growth. Finally, Clark's model of the harvest does not respond to
price, but only to the stock of fish. My model considers the effect of both the stock and
the price on the quantity supplied.
The Ricker Salmon Model is another dynamic analysis of fisheries. 12 It models
the rate of growth of a stock of salmon in the absence of harvesting and the dynamic path
to or away from equilibrium. The model determines the rate of growth through variables

including the adult population size, the rate of growth ofjuveniles (which acts as a
measure of population density, creating effects similar to my use of a logistic equation),
and the mortality of the juveniles. However, Greenwell and Ng's discussion admits that
the model is deterministic and does not conveniently include the effect of random
variables, such as climate.
Interestingly, Greenwell and Ng found that the model exhibits chaotic behavior,
depending on the value assigned to the constant of proportionality between the number of
recruits and the number of adults in the next generation. Further, by changing the values
assigned to their proportionality constants, they could manipulate the system from a
stable to an unstable equilibrium. This corresponds well with my model, which shows
the existence of a stable equilibrium level of stock to depend on the intrinsic rate of
growth of the fish stock.
Greenwell and Ng also provide an interesting perspective on the incentives of
fishermen. They assume that fishermen do not want a sustainable catch indefInitely, nor
that fishermen want to maximize the present net value of all use of the fishery. And, in
truth, these interests certainly are closer to interests of society than fishermen. Instead,
fishermen seek to maximize the total catch for a finite time period, perhaps the remainder
of his life or career. Thus the fisherman has no economic incentive to leave a viable
fishery. However, their analysis of this motive is not useful to me since they do not allow
for variations in price from changes in supply.
James A. Brander and M. Scott Taylor did a dynamic analysis similar to mine for
resource use on Easter Island. They attempted to explain the disappearance of the
civilization that erected the island's giant statues. They determined that, given a slow
growing resource, the human population would overshoot equilibrium with the island's
12

Greenwell and Ng, "The Ricker Salmon ModeL"
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natural resources and collapse. This is consistent with my model, where we will see that
the intrinsic growth rate offish and the rate of harvest can affect the model nearly
identically,13
Tracy Lewis notes, as Greenwell and Ng explained, that fisheries are not
deterministic in their behavior. Instead, they have a variety of unpredictable economic
and biological and climatic influences. He forms a system for decision-making in fishery
regulation given this uncertainty and finds that optimal strategies are based on the level of
uncertainty and the regulator's preference for risk-taking. 14 I can only note that this
discussion oflmcertainty is prevalent among researchers and offer this caveat to my
work: a model is always a simplification of reality.
Gordon Munro explained competition in a fishery as a prisoner's dilemma. Each
fisherman has an incentive to restrain fishing so the fishery is not destroyed. However,
this would require personally curtailing one's catch. Since no fisherman has the ability to
control the behavior of other fishermen, he will fish to the point that Total Cost and Total
Revenue become equal, depriving both fishermen and society of any economic surplus,

'
d prevIous
' Iy. 15
as d Iscusse
Charles Mason and Stephen Polasky consider the effect of changes in the number
of firms in a commonly shared resource: "Increasing industry size raises costs but lowers
prices; thus it has ambiguous welfare effects," They determined that the optimal number
of firms changes as the total stock changes. 16 In my model the number of firms is
endogenous. However, instead of changing to reflect an optimal number, it changes in
response to economic incentives; as profits increase fishermen enter the industry.

In a study of the collapse of cod stocks in the Atlantic outside of Canada., Ransom
A. Myers, Jeffrey A. Hutchings, and Nicholas J. Barrowman tested whether poor

recruitment contributed. Their results suggested that it did not and that overfisbing was
the outstanding culprit. This lends credibility to my model, which, although lacking a
stochastic variable for unpredictable movements in biological or economic conditions,
looks towards the total effort put into fisb.i.ng to explain changes in stock. If low

Brander and Taylor, "The Simple Economics of Easter Island."
Lewis, "Exploitation ofa Renewable Resource under Uncertainty."
IS Munro "Approaches to the Economics of the Management of High Seas Fishery Resources."
16 Mason and Polasky, "The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons."
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recruitment were important in the collapse of these stocks, then my model, which
exogenously mandates the recruitmen~ would be less useful. 17

17

Myers, Hutchings, and Barrowman, "Why do Fish Stocks Collapse?"
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III.

Derivation of the Model:
Assumptions

Almost all of my work was completed on Maple V, a mathematical software
program. The Appendix includes the Maple documents J used to derive the system of
equations and analyze the phase plane. It is attached only for those who wish to fully
investigate the mathematical logic I followed.
I begin my assumptions with the Schaeffer model of fisheries:

dx(l)
dl

= F(x(t)) -

F(x(t))

h(x(l)

xU)
= r· xU), (1--)

k

Here the stock of fish at a time t is represented by x(t). The change in the stock is a
function of the natural growth rate of the stock F(x(t)), minus the rate at which the stock
is harvested, h(x(t)). F(x(t)) is a function of a population limit, k, the intrinsic rate of
growth of the stock, r, and the stock size at that time. The natural rate of growth of the
stock is therefore logistic.
I chose a linear demand curve for simplicity:

p(t)=a-b'Q(t)

Here price at time t,p(t), is a function of the quantity offish demanded at t, Q(t), and the
linear parameters a and b. The demand curve is assumed to be linear for simplification.
If I assume that the quantity demanded always equals the quantity supplied, then I

can further specify Q(t) as the quantity offish supplied at time 1. Thus, I set it equal to
the number of firms/fishermen in the industry, n, multiplied by the quantity supplied per
fisherman, q(t). This assumes homogeneity among the motivations and choices of
fishermen.

17

Q(t) = n(t)· q(/)

I establish the number of firms, n, as an extrinsic variable. Given economic
profits, firms should enter the industry. Given losses, firms should exit. Thus, n is a
function of the profits of fishermen, Y(t).

net) = il + i2· yet)

I can still treat n as an endogenous variable by settingi2, what may be called the marginal
propensity of firms to enter or exit, equal to O. Then specification ofil establishes the
number of fIrms for the system.
My utility function was originally chosen for simplicity, and set to be

U(t) = Y(t)· L(I), a function of income and hours of leisure, L(/), enjoyed. I have since
updated it to a Cobb-Douglas function:

V(t):= cd· Y(t)"}' . L(t)d

I can still return to the original function by setting cd, cy and ct equal to 1. Naturally, if
profIt from fishing is zero, utility will be zero as well.
Use of the Cobb-Douglas function allows me to control the returns to scale of
income and leisure. If cy and cI sum to I then there are constant returns to scale. If they
sum to more than one then there are increasing returns to scale. If they sum to less than
one then there are decreasing returns to scale. My notation is thus more flexible than the
frequent notation of V:::; yZ . L'-2, which can only sum to

1.\8

Income is simply set equal to total costs minus total revenue:

Y(t)

:=

TR(t) - TC(t)

TR(t) = q(t). pet)
TC(t)

= w(t)· f

+/
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In the total cost equatio~ w is the hours devoted to work, or fishing,jis the marginal
costs of fishing per hour, including fuel, and 1 represents sunk costs such as investment in
capital. Although 1 is entered as a constant in this version of the model, it may be useful
later to let it change in response to interest rates.
Here it may be helpful to note that, although the equations are expressed as
instantaneous rates of change, I run the model by setting the period of time t equal to a
week. For example, w{t) does not refer to instantaneous consumption of work, but
instead to work consumed in period t. Likewise, dx(t) refers to the change in the stock
dt
of fish in one week, as opposed to the instantaneous rate of change of the stock. So
although I use the notation of differential equations, the model should be interpreted as
difference equations. Since I have chosen a week as my timeframe, the hours of leisure
consumed per week becomes:

L(t) = 168 - wet) 19

I specify the amount of fish a fisherman can catch according to the Schaeffer
model. It is dependent on the stock offish in the sea x(t), the hours worked w, and the
efficiency of fishermen, a. The stock of fish is relevant because, as the population
density drops, it becomes more difficult to catch fish. Furthermore, a can be used as a
proxy oftechnology.2o This specification of q{t) can then be substituted into f{l).

q(t) = a· x(t)· wet)· u

Y(t)

=(a' x(t)· w(t)· u· p(t) -

w(t)· f -!)

18 For further discussion of Cobb-Douglas functions, see Brown, "Cobb-Douglas Function" and Pearce, ed.,
"Cobb-Douglas production function."
19 Another interesting function would be to set L(t)
1- w(t). so that leisure and work would be
measured as percents oftoral time in a period.
20 An untested idea is to let a increase with time to model advances in technology. But, considering the
shon timeframe of my model, such changes are irrelevant

=

19

The variable u can be viewed as a parameter for analysis of season regulation. It is
motivating a change in harvesting efficiency in response to shorter fishing seasons being
enforced.
Table 3.1 specifies the units of each variable in my assumptions. It is necessary
to know the units involved because I later specify value for variables in the model and
some of these specifications are based on real world data.

Table 3.1
F(x)

Ibs of growth of the fish stock in one week

h(x)

lbs of fish harvested in ooe week

r

Intrinsic biological rate of growth of the .fish stock; percent growth per
week

x

Ibs of fish in the fishery

k

Maximum sustainable stock of fish in lbs

P
a

$ Price of 1 lb of fish

b

Marginal propensity to consume fish

Q

lbs offish supplied by all fishermen in the industry

n

Number of fishermen/flTDls in the fishery

q

lbs of fish harvested by one fisherman in one period

U

Utility of fishermen

y

$ Income

L

Hours of leisure consumed per week

TR
TC

Tota! Revenue

Autonomous demand for fish

Total Costs

w

Hours worked per week

f

Marginal cost of 1 hour of fishing

1

$ Fixed costs of fishing per week

g

% of available stock caught by I fisherman in 1 hour

u

Scaling factor for productivity

20

cd

Efficiency parameter in Cobb-Douglas utility function

cI

Elasticity of utility with respect to leisure

cy

Elasticity of utility with respect to income

jJ

Number of fishermen/firms at economic profits

j2

Propensity of fishermen to enter or leave industry; fishermen per dollar

IV.
Proof that the Supply Curve is Backwards Bending

Given my assumptions, an individual fisherman seeking to maximize utility will
make decisions that create a backward bending supply curve. Thus, as the price of fish
rises, ceteris paribus, a fisherman will actually work less.
What follows is a mathematical proof of this phenomenon:
Assumptions 21 :

U = cd· yey . Lei
Y:;;:p-a-w-x-w'f-I
L=T-w

Proof:

U=cd(p·a-w-x-w·f -1)o/·(T-wt
dU cdcy·(p·a·w·x-w-f-1)"'·(T-wt' ·(p·a·x- f) cd·c/·(p·a-w-x-w-!-I)o/·(T_W)d
dw
p·a·w-x-w·f-I
T-w
dU
let-=O
dw
cdcy·(p·a-w·x-w·f-1)o/·(T-wt ·(p·a·x- f) cd-cl·(p'a'w,x-w, f -1)"'-(T_W)cI
p·a·w·x-w-f-I
T-w
cdcy·(p·a-w·x-w·f-It'·(T-w)d+I·(p·a·x-f)=cd-c/·(p·a·w·x-w·f -1)')'+I-(T-wt
cy·(T-w)·(p·a·x- f)=c/-(p·a·w·x-w·f-I)
cy. T· f -c/o I -cy. Y. p' a· x
cy. T· (f -p- a- x)-cl· I
w=---=---~---"---"----cy. f +c/. f -cy. p' a- x-c/- p' a· x
(cy+c~' (f - p- a- x)
cy. T (f - p' a· x)
c/- I
w= ----:.----:::....----:.-----.:
(cy+c~·(f -p·a-x) (cy+c~-(f-p·a·x)
cy. T
c/-I
w=--....:;..
(cy+cO (cy+cO'(f -p'a'x)

These are all equations from my previous assumptions. However, r changed the lime frame from one
week, 168 hOUTS, to the more flexible T.

21

22

From the final equation we can see that any increase in price, p, will increase the second
tenn in the function., causing the hours worked, w, to decrease. Thus, the supply cwve
bends backwards. Mathematically, this results from assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility

function and positive fixed costs.
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v.
Derivation of the Model:
Deriving a System of Eq nations

'The steps in the derivation oftrus model produce extremely long and
complicated formulas. As a result, I will describe the process and let the more intrepid
follow it on the Maple attachments. I will then present the system of equations that
resulted.
The first step is to substitute q(t) into the total revenue formula. Then this new
total revenue formula and the total cost formula are substituted into the formula for
income, y(t). This formula is then substituted into net), which in turn is substituted into
Q(t).
I then substitute my functions for income and leisure into the utility function. I
take this new utility function, differentiate it with respect to w, and then solve for w. I
substitute this into the most recent formula for q(t) which is then substituted it and the
formula for w into the most recent formula for Q(t). I now have the terms necessary for
the first equation, dx(t).
dt

To find the next equation I differentiated a Q(t) function with respect to t and
solved for dP(t). This produces the system of equations. These equations are expressed
dt

as Maple V expressed them:

d

ci >(/) =n(/)

(Y(/)]
1----,;  (

. .{g>(t)(16&yg>(/}Uf(t)-16&:yf+clIl)uf(t)
(l6&yg>(t)uj:(t) -16&.Y.[+cJ/l)j
.~~
) 1 +J
-II g>(t)
eygY(t) uJ:(t) -cyf+clg>(t) uJ:(/) -elf
cyg>(t) uJ:(t) -cyf+clg'!(t) uf(t) -elf

~

(16 &yg>(t) u IX:t) -16 &>1+c/ll) u} (cyg>( t) uIX: t) -cxf+c/g >(t) u IX:t) -elf)
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~ pC,) = - g(~ X(t») u (a p(/) el 2 + 168/0' 2 bjl-bJ·

_ cy

j"_(

b

2
i~ - (168f-168gX(t)UP(t)+II)0')
0'+ cl
cl II

168/- 168 g x( I) U p( I) + II)
cy+c1

"

+ 168 f

2

bjl el II - 0' bjl clll + 168[0' bjl el

b .{_ ( 168 f
J

CY)
clII

-

168 g x( I) U PC I) + IJ) 0' )
eI
cy+ c1
+ 168frv 2 bJof _ (168j - 168..g xU) U pC I) + II) Cy )
2
-.r
"
cy+cl
-2cyp(/) cl+0'2 ap(t)
cy

- cy2 p(t)2 _ p(/i el 2 + 2 cya el p(/) - 336 0'2 b g xCI) uji P(/)

j"_

- 336 cy b g x(t) ujl pC/) cI
_ 336 cy2 b g x( I) u

C168 f

~

- 168 g xC I) u p( I) + ll) cy )
0'+cl

P{/)

)
_ 336 cy b g x(t) u Xl _ (1681- 168 g x(t) u pC/) + 1/) CY )
~
0' + cl
p(t cl

+28224/0'2 bgxCt) uD(j2l- C1681-168gx(/) up(t)+II) CY)
~
cy+ c/
pC/)

_ 168 cy b g x(t) u DU2 )(_ (168 f

-

168 g xC I) u p( I) + ll) CY) I II ( )
cy+cl
c
pI

_ 28224 0'2 b I xC t) 2u2 DU2)( _ ( 168 f

- 168 g0'+
xC I) u p( t) + 11) 0')
2)
cl
pet)

/

( 2 cy a cl g x( t) u - 4 cy g x( t) u p(t) cl
-168cy 2blx(/)2

- 1680'2 b I

U2p(-

~
2
X(t)2 u jl

(168/-168 g X(/)U P(t)+IJ)cy)
0'+cl

-168CYb g2 X(t)2?1DU'2)(- (168/-168 g X(I)UP(/)+II)0')
cy+cl
ellJ

+ 28224/ cy2 b i X(t)2 u 2 D(j2)(- ( 168/- 168 g x( 1) u p( t) + II) CY)
cy+c1

- 1680' b i X(t)2 u 2 jl el
_ 168 0' b

i

x( 1)2 u2 p(_ C168 f

~

-

168 g x(t) u p( I) + II) Cy )

cy+cl

el

_ 28224 cy2 b f? X(t)3 u 3 DU2 )(_ ( 168/- 168 g xU) u p( I) + 1I) 0')
cy + cI
p(/)
- 2 0'2 g XCI) u p(t) + a g XCI) U el 2 + cy2 a g X(/) u - 2 g x(t) u pCt) el 2 + jel

2

+ 2 f cy cI + f cy2 )

25

VI.

Derivation of Parameters for System of Equations

Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve for meaningful equilibriums or phase
movements with these equations as they are. In order to create a graphical phase plane, I
need to numerically simulate the parameters in an actual fishery. Therefore, I need to
pick values for the parameters that make sense when considered together. Otherwise the
calibration would produce results that do not mimic reality. The more realistic I make the
values I pick, the more useful the model will be.
I can set certain parameters almost arbitrarily because the actual values do not
maner as much as the relations between the values or because they are only important
relative to the analysis of the phase plane. For instance, the maximum sustainable
population, k, was picked as 132,300,000 Ibs offish. 22 The variable costs per hour,.r. are
set to I and the fiXed costs per week, I, are set to 7, a fixed cost of 1 per day.
I decided to use 113 as the maximum possible growth in stock, the MSy,23 To
detennine the intrinsic rate of growth of the system, r, I entered this value into the logistic
formula:

1

x(t)

F(x(t)) = x(t)· - = r· x(t)· (1--)
3
k

Since r is equal to the growth rate at the MSY, and since the MSY occurs where
k

x(t) =-, we can solve for r as follows:
2

Despite the apparent specificity of k, it was based loosely on data on cod landings in Fisheries ofthe
United Stales, 2002 (pritchard ed.) and is a ralher significant underestimation of the actual maximum

22

population sustainable in a cod fishery. However, this model's analysis applies to relative, not absolute
movements in stock, making the discrepancy irrelevant.
23 This was based loosely on Atlantic cod data from Status 0/ Fishery Resources off/he Northeaslern
United States/or 1998 (Clark ed.). After completing my analysis with my data, I found Mayo and
O'Brien's article "Atlantic Cod," which gives precise data for an Atlantic cod fishery. Future research may
want to use this more realistic data as r have not.
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1

I

-=r·(-)
3
2
2
r=

3

However, since my period oftime is one week, and 1/3 stock growth refers to growth
over a year, the r that I am looking for is 2/3 divided by 52 weeks. Thus, F.01269.24
For this first model I also set a so that the maximum stock fishermen can remove

in one year is equal to the MSY. That is to say, if fishermen consumed no leisure, and
fished constantly, each could only catch .000038% of the fish in the ocean in one hour.

fish
hours
.01269--+ 168--+ 100fishermen = .00000038

week

week

This approximation assumes 100 fishermen in the industry. Thus, I set the number of
fishermen if there are no economic profits, j I, equal to 100. The propensity of fishermen
to enter and exit the industry,j2, was set to .0001 by trial and error, so there are not

impossibly large or irrelevantly small changes in the number of fishermen as profits
change.
The demand parameters were implied through data of the price and quantity of
cod in consecutive years. Table 6.1 displays the data that was used.

Table 6.1
2001

Atlantic Cod
Harvest

* weight in

2002

weight·

value"

weight

value

33,211

32,086

28,941

26,570

1000 Ibs

•• value in $\000

Ln this and some other calculations Tsimply ignore the compounding effects of stock growth, which are
marginal at best.

24
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I set up the following simultaneous equations and solved for a and b:

32,086,000
33,211,000

= a - b. 33 211 000
"

30,715,000 =a-b.28941 000
28,941,000
"

a = 1.7064
b = .00000002
In doing so I make a large assumption about this data. I have assumed that the change in
price and quantity is a result of a shift in the supply curve. However, Joshua D. Angrist,
Kathryn Graddy, and Guido W. 1mbens have pointed out that identifying either curve
"requires the presence of separate instruments that shift either demand or supply but not
both.'.l5 The data I used may reflect shifts in either or both curves, not just the supply
curve as I would like.
Of the other variables, I initially set

cd.

eI, and cy equal to 1. Thus constructs the

simplest utility function: U = Y . L.
Figure 6. t shows the supply curve, which was previously shown to be backward
bending, given these parameters. Since, for the chosen values of cl and cy, income and
leisure are weighted equally, fishermen will chose to work about half a week, depending
on the price. The curve is asymptotic to w=84.

15

Angrisl, Graddy, and Jrnbens. "The [nterpretation ofTnstrumental Variables Estimators in Simultaneous

Equations Models with an Application to the Demand for Fish," pg 500.
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Figure 6.1
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VII.
The Resulting Model

Once I had substituted the parameter specifications into the system of equations I
solved for equilibriums and nullclines. Equilibriums are price and stock levels at which
the price and stock no longer wish to move. That is, at equilibrium dp(t) and dx(t) will

dt

effectively equal 0 or

00.

dt

Nullclines are points where either price or quantity has no

pressure to move, but not both. Nullclines have at least one of the following
characteristics: dP(I)
dt

=0,

dx(t)
dt

=0,

one with the characteristic that dp(t)
dt

dp(t)
d/

=00,

dx(t)
dl

=00.

=0 and the other with

!ftwo nullclines intersect,
dx(t)
dt

=0, then the

intersection will be a stable equilibrium point, since both stock and price will no longer
have any pressure to move. 26
I fIrst search for equilibriums and nullclines by setting each equation in the
system equal to 0 and then solving for price. This technique yields nullclines where
either dp(t) or dx(t) are zero; barring any shocks to the system, the price and stock will
dt

d/

want to stay constant.
The next set of nuJlclines were derived by solving for price, p, where the
denominators of dp(t) and dx(t) equal zero. These lines represent values where
dt
dp(t)
dt

= 00 or

dx(t)
dt

dt

= 00. Mathematically though, the system will never move onto these

lines, as they represent nonsensical values where an equation is divided by O. However,
due to the large changes in stock and/or price, the system gets infinitely close to those
points without actually attaining them.
Figure 7.1 approximates the relevant features of the resulting phase plane. The
lines represent movements in the different quadrants as well as along the lines. We know
26 At all points in the phase plane the Quantity Supplied will e<jual the Quantity Demand and fishermen will
maximize their Utility, since these conditions were assumed in the model's specification.
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this to be the relevant area from the data used to derive the demand curve; price was
about $1 per pound and the stock must be between 0 and the chosen maximum
sustainable yield (k).

Figure 7.1
Price $
A

1

B

c
k

Stock

Key
Line A:

d~;t) = 0

dp(t)

--=00

dt

dx(t) = 0
dt

I found three nullclines in the relevant area of the phase plane. The highest line,
line A, is a convenient upper bound for the range of prices worth examining. At line A,

dp(l)
dt

= O. Given my parameters, the equation for line A is:
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2133

P = 2500 -

5107205107
1
8.10 19
. X + 8.1019 .

~( 4.6599119370304.10 39 - 6.97194783566784.10 29 . X + 26083544004966881449· x 2
Line B represents points where dp(t)
dl

= 00. Points near the line are pushed towards

the stock value x = Ev according to the phase planes dynamics. The movement of these
values does not occur strictly along line B, since values on the curve are not
mathematically sensible (values along line B require dividing by 0).
Points near line B and below the stock level x= Ev experience an increase in stock
and either an increase or decrease in price, depending on the price at the initial value. If
the initial value of price is above line B, it will increase over time. If it is below it will
decrease. For values near line B and above the stock value x

= Ev , the price is pushed

towards line B so the system will seem to move towards the stock level x= Ev along line

B. Given my parameters, the equation for line B is:

p

=-2.631578947 .10-18. -5.10 25 -

19

3.24216.10

•

x + 1.212961213.10

9
.

x

2

X

Line C is a function derived by setting dx(t) = O. It bas a vertical asymptote at
dl

Ev . For values along line C but below Ev , the pressure on price is negative. For values
above Ev the pressure on price is positive. This means that, even though there is no
pressure on stock to change at points on line C, the price will still be forced to change,
which will cause the system to continue to adjust. The equation for line C, given my

parameters, is:

=5 .10 8 •
p

11
-1.274180896.10 + 1269· x
x· (-2.387511458 .1013 + 24111· x)

For simplicity my further analysis of this system focuses on the most relevant
values. Given the data used for the derivations of my parameters, these values are the
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four quadrants shown in Figure 7.2. It is these quadrants that my following analysis
refers to by number.

Figure 7.2
Price $

1 ~t.

QII

A

.-.
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B
QUI

QIV

~

.1
c

0

I

Ev

k

Stock

Points in QI seek equilibrium where lines B and C meet. In QI, if the stock drops,

ceteris paribus, fishermen will work more hours, total revenues drop, total costs will
increase, fishermen will exit the indum-y,' and the quantity supplied by both individual
fishermen and the industry will decrease. If stock drops then fishermen need to work
more hours to catch the same amount of fish. As they work more, they incur more
marginal costs, driving up total costs. Profits drop as a result and fishermen exit the
industry. The lower efficiency of fishermen, due to a lower fish density, and the fewer
fishermen in the industry, end up being stronger influences on the harvest than the
increase in hours worked.
If price drops, ceteris paribus, the same changes occur, except in the case of
quantity supplied. Quantity supplied increases for both the industry and the individuals
when price drops. When price drops, fishermen again react by working more so as to

33

cover fixed costs. Again marginal costs go up, profits down, and fishermen exit the
industry. However, in this case the increased hours worked actually outweighs the
negative effects on quantity supplied of fewer fishermen. The difference is that, initially,
the stock has not also dropped so the harvesting efficiency offishennen has remained the
same.
The trend in QI is for both the price and stock to drop as the system moves toward
equilibrium. Equilibrium is found at the intersection of lines B and C where dp{t)
dt
and dx( t)
dt

= 00

= O. Although the system never moves onto the asymptote, it essentially

moves infinitely close to the intersection and., barring shocks to the system, will stay
there. The result of these simultaneous movements is that fishermen work more hours,
some fishermen exit the industry as revenue drops and costs rise, and the quantity
supplied by both fishermen and the industry decreases. Thus, the effects of the decrease
in stock on the quantity supplied outweigh the effects of the decrease in price.
In QI, the quantity supplied decreases over time for two reasons. First, as the
stock of fish decreases, the productivity from an hour of fishing decreases because of
lower fish density. Also, since fishermen are leaving the industry, there are fewer boats
to catch fish. This outweighs the effects of fishermen working more, which they chose to
do because the price has dropped.
Over time, the price in QI also decreases. As the price drops, effort increases and,
even though fishermen exit the industry, the total quantity supplied feels pressw-e to
increases. This. fu:rilier causes the price to drop. However, as the stock decreases, the
harvesting efficiency of ,fishermen decreases, due to lower population density, and there
is an overall lower quantity supplied. This provides a positive pressure on price. In QI
the negative pressure governs the movement to equilibrium. However, as the system
adjusts to equilibrium, the magnitude of the positive pressure on price increases relative
to the magnitude of the negative pressure because the stock continues to drop. These
pressures balance out when line B is met.
Table 7.1 provides some approximates of relevant points used in this analysis:
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Table 7.1

p

X

w

TC

TR

n

dx
dt

tip

383436 2790

-241860

-0.00499

Q

Q

-

(*10 8)

dr

1

1.2

84.078

137.43

1

1.3

84.072

140.62 4153.17 91.072

415358

2953

-386679

-.00729

1.2

1.2

84.065

145.09 4600.05

383375

2642

-241799

-0.00175

3833.97 91.078

91.065

Table 7.2 gives the corresponding approximate values at points along an
equilibrium path. The values for this table are arrived from first specifying an initial
condition and then adding the dx and dp at that point to the point's p and x values to

dl

dt

determine the next point.

Table 7.2

p

x

w

n

TR

TC

Q

q

(*10~
I

1.2

dx

dp

d'

dt

-

84.07

137.4

383

91.07

38343

279

-

-

8

3

3

8

6

0

24186

0.0049

0

9

.99501

1.1975

84.07

137.1

380

91.07

38266

278

-

-

2

8

9

6

7

9

5

9

23859

0.0051

5

2

All approximations were made for the benefit of the tables and do not interfere
with the analysis of variable movements. All four quadrants were analyzed in this
manner.
Also, as the stock and price decrease, the rate of change of dx(t) decreases and

.

m

the rate of change of dp(1) increases. Both of these effects reinforce the trend in stock

d'
and price illustrated in Figure 7.3. As the system'moves toward equilibrium in QI, the
change in price begins to dominate the effect., and the change in stock matters less and
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less until the system nearly moves vertically to line B. If the price is high enough at the
initial condition, though, the system may move to line C instead. Figure 7.3 illustrates
both types of movements with dashed lines.

Figure 7.3
C
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Since the rate of growth of the fish stock is dependant on the current stock
population, per the logistic model, as the stock drops in QI, the rate of the stocks growth
wilt increase. Thus, we may have an economic explanation for the asymptote in line C.

This is where the magnitude of the harvest and the magnitude of the stock's growth
intersect. At stock levels below the asymptote the fish stock grows faster than it can be
harvested. Once it passes ,the asymptote, it slows down enough for the harvesting to
force negative growth. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4
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Mathematically, since I set the productivity of fishermen to be close to the
maximum sustainable yield (the marginal effects of compounding were ignored), the
existence of such an asymptote could be expected. As stock decreases, the rate of stock
growth increases and the efficiency of fishermen decreases. Intuitively, at low stock
levels, the growth of the fish stock should motivate stock movements more than the
harvest rate. As the stock approached its biological carrying capacity, its rate of growth
declines and the per hour efficiency of fishermen increases. Intuitively, again, there may
be a stock size where the stock stops its tendency to grow and begins to shrink for all
larger values. This stock size is the asymptote in line C.
QIV has many conflicts between the influences of a decline in stock and a rise in
price, unlike QI, where the only conflict along the equilibrium path was the quantity
supplied. In QIV, as stock drops, ceteris paribus, there are increases in hours-worked.
and total costs. There are decreases total revenue, the number of fishermen (due to lower
profits), the quantity supplied by industry and individual fishermen, and dx(t) and
dt
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dp(t). As price rises, ceteris paribus, there are declines in hours worked, total costs,

d'
quantity supplied by the industry and the individual fishermen, and dx(t). There are
df
increases in the number of fishermen, total revenue, and dp(t). Between these two
dt
tendencies there are conflicts in the movement of hours worked, the number of
fishermen, total revenue, total costs, and dp(t). When the stock drops, ceteris paribus,
dt
harvesting efficiency decreases, which drops total revenue. To compensate, some
fishermen leave the industry and others begin to work more, (which increases costs). The
net effect, though, is a drop in the quantity supplied. When price increases, ceteris
paribus, fishermen work less (which drives costs down) and yet still experience an

increase in revenue. Also, people enter the industry. However, the effect of each
fisherman working less dominates and the quantity supplied from the individuals and the
industry both drop.

In QIV, as we move to equilibrium, hours worked and total costs increase while
the number of fishermen, total revenues, quantity supplied by the industry, quantity
supplied by individual fishermen, dx(t), and dp(t) all decreased. In all cases of
dt
dt
conflicting tendencies, the effects of a decreasing stock were greater than the effects of
the rise in price.
The first result is that the stock decreases until the decreased efficiency of
fishermen, caused by lower population density, is offset by the rise in the rate of stock
growth, as specified per the logistic model. As discussed above, this corresponds to the
asymptote of line C. The second result is that the price rises until the positive effect on
price from the decrease in quantity supplied is offset by the negative effect on price from
a lower stock, which causes fishermen to work more until they succeed in catching
enough fish to halt the decreasing quantity supplied.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the possible movements to equilibrium in QIV.
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Figure 7.5
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QII and QUI are symmetries of the anaJysis that occurred in QIV and QI. Thus, in
QII, stock wiJl increase to the asymptote where the effect of a low stock on the growth
rate is baJanced by the effect of a denser stock on the harvesting efficiency. Also, price
will rise until the decrease in hours worked, and the corresponding decrease in quantity
supplied, is counterbalanced by the entry of new fishermen into the industry. In QUI,
again we see stock being forced towards the vertical asymptote and price being forced
down for reasons that mirror QI.
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VITI.
Dynamic Shifts

Having constructed the model and explained the logic governing the movements
of stock and price, I can now examine what happens when the model experiences
dynamic shifts. These are shocks to the parameters that fundamentally change the phase
plane and cause all conditions to follow a new path to a new equilibrium, even if they
initially were at equilibrium. These shocks can be demonstrated by changing the values I
used for my parameters. All graphs assume that equilibrium is the initial condition.

Key
Original Phase Lines:

New Phase Lines:

-----
----...---------.----

New Paths to Equilibrium: - ..... _

---- --- ---

---

Changes in the Intrinsic Growth Rate (r)
As r increases the vertical asymptote of line C moves right until it approaches the
maximum sustainable

populatio~ which

it does not cross. The result is that the stock of

fish will have a greater tendency towards equilibrium. With a high enough intrinsic
growth rate the system will tend towards the MSy27
Figure 8.1 demonstrates this movement. The movements in lines A and B are
negligible have been ignored for simplicity in this graph.

Since, in reality, a system is constantly being shocked out of any equilibrium, the true equilibrium for
stock has always been the asymptote. That is., if the system is at equilibrium anywhere on line B, almost
any shock will cause it to move closer to the asymptote. Exceptions include unlikely shocks such as 8
sudden increase in the stock offish.

27
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Figure 8.1
C

Price $

C*
A

B

A
"i

0

Ev

£yo

k

Stock

However, more likely than a sudden increase in the intrinsic growth rate of fish is
a decrease, from such causes as pollution or climate changes. In this case the asymptote
would move left, and the system would seek an equilibrium at a lower vaJue ofx. Should
the rate drop too far the stock will go to zero over time and the fishery will be destroyed.
GraphicaJly, this is simply the reverse of the dynamic response to an increase in r.

Changes in the Efficiency of Fishermen (g)

A decrease in g works similar to an increase in r in that the asymptote is pushed to
the MSY. However, the system also collapses inward and leftward so that new quadrants
become of interest should the change be on a magnitude of ten times greater efficiency.
Figure 8.2 illustrates the resulting graph for such a drastic decrease in g and some
corresponding shifts to equilibrium.
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Figure 8.2
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An increase in g shifts the vertical asymptote left until it becomes irrelevant and

the system always moves to equilibrium through decreases in stock. Thus, eventually
such a system would drive stock to zero, again destroying the fishery. Figure 8.3
illustrates this system.
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Figure 8.3
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It turns out that the ratio between rand g is the main determinate of equilibrium.
If one is too high, relative to the other, its effect will dominate and either drive the stock
to the MS Y or to zero. When the ratio is managed so that fishermen could, at most, only
remove about the MSY in a year, the phase diagram has equilibrium points at the
intersection of lines B and C as I found.

Changes in Demand (a)
Increases in a increase the p values of lines A and B so that, for the relevant
values, line C becomes the only relevant line. In other words, as a increases, QUI and

QN expand until they are the only relevant quadrants. Adjustments to equilibrium thus
follow the explanations given previously for those quadrants.
Decreases in a have the opposite effect, lowering lines A and B until the only
relevant quadrants are those two above line A. However, adjustments to this new phase
plane will be the same as the previous plane in that the system tends towards the vertical
asymptote.
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Changes in Marginal Costs

if>

Increases in marginal costs mimic the results of a decrease in g, which is
diagrammed in Figure 8.2, except that the vertical asymptote does not move in this case.
Decreases in marginal costs only seeID to flatten the curves in lines A, B, and C so
that, with the exception of the asymptote which has not moved, they look nearly
horizontal. Dynamics simply follow the logic of whatever quadrant the equilibriums
ended up in. Essentially though, this just further motivates the system to find an
equilibrium for stock at the vertical asymptote. Marginal costs do not greatly seem to
affect the phase plane.

Changes in Fixed Costs (1)
Changes in fixed costs IDay cause line C to fundamentally alter the phase plane.
Notably, QUI shrinks and the tendencies ofQIV push into its area, al shown in Figure
8.4. Furthermore, line D, which previously has always traced line B, has come into its
own and now is relevant. Figure 8.4 shows the change assuming a IOO-times increase in
fixed costs.
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Figure 8.4
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When fIxed costs are lowered, the phase plane does not change to any significant
degree. Line C simply drops lower and the original quadrants are intact.

Changes in the Elasticity of Utility with Respect to Income (0') and Leisure (d)
These variables mimic each other: a decrease in one corresponds to an increase in
the other. If cy is decreases or if cI is increased the vertical asymptote moves right until it
hits the MSY. This mimics Figure 8.1. lithe opposite occurs, then the asymptote moves

left, causing the equilibrium stock to be lower.
These variables affect the preferences of fishermen for work or leisure. As the
elasticity of utility with respect to income drops, fishermen will choose to work less
because, given their previous equilibrium, the marginal utility of leisure relative to
income will have increased. Likewise, if the elasticity of utility with respect to leisure
should increase, fishermen will work with the same motivations. Opposite changes in
these variables have opposite effects.
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IX.
Conclusion

In conclusion I have several observations on the model, its implications, and the
possibilities for future research. First, it seems that if the efficiency of fishermen does
not overwhelm the intrinsic growth rate oithe fish, then there will be an equilibrium that
the system moves towards. This has been represented as the intersection of lines B and
C. If the efficiency is too great, however, the stock of fish will decrease to zero.

Boycotts, fish farming, and anything else that decreases the consumers demand
for fish caught in an open-access fishery affect the position of line B. They do not
change the equilibrium stock level, which is maintained at E v. If the system is already at
equilibrium, a decrease in demand, a, will cause the price to move down along the
asymptote of line C to the new equilibrium; the stock of fish changes very httle while the
price drops.
If the system is in QI and not at equilibrium when demand drops, then the stock of
fish will begin to drop faster on its approach to the equilibrium stock because fishennen
will supply a greater quantity of fish. The ultimate equilibrium stock level, though, does
not change significantly. Thus, lower demand does not significantly affect the long run
equilibrium stock level.

If, on the other hand, no stable equilibrium exists (perhaps harvesting efficiency is
too great for the system), then the stock is moving to zero over time anyways. However,
a decrease in demand, by encouraging a larger quantity of fish to be supplied, will
accelerate the decrease in stock and give policymakers less time to save the fishery.
Thus, to significantly increase the long-run stock level of a fishery, the vertical
asymptote of line C must be increased. Through regulation this can be done with a
decreased fishing season. In this model, setting the variable u in the quantity-supplied
equation such that 0 < u > 1 will act as a restriction on the length of the fishing season by
decreasing the amount offish that can possibly be caught in a year. Since this value is
essentially alters g, changes in u have the same dynamics as changes in g, which change
the long-run stock equilibrium.
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The model does have several weak aspects that future research may want to
remedy. First, the estimation of the demand curve is poor, as noted before. It takes real
world data an~ assumes that they reflect a single demand curve, whereas the data may in
fact reflect several different curves.
The model also sets the investment decision of fishermen exogenously. In fact,
investment should be a function of current profits, the interest rate, and the expected
future income. Making it endogenous would more realistically model the decision
making process as investment should vary with the current price and stock. This could
also help model the overcapitalization of fisheries that occurs when regulations are placed
on the length of the fishing season. My model does not show the economic inefficiencies
of overcapitalization. In any new model it would also be helpful to let the harvesting
efficiency of fishermen vary with investment, so that new equipment can increase
efficiency.
Also, the decision of fishermen to enter or exit is set to be a function of profits.
As profits increase fishermen enter and as profits decrease they exit. My specification of
this behavior gives fishermen the same propensity to enter and exit the industry. Instead,
it may be more realistic to make fishermen more reluctant to leave the industry, given the
barriers to exit, than to enter the industry.
I also have not examined the model for the time it takes to adjust to equilibrium.
At times, it seemed like the system slowed as it approached equilibrium, making me
wonder how the time dynamics change throughout the phase plane. Future research
could also use real world parameters to test the model's predictive validity. This would

be the most useful evaluation of the model.
To summarize, the general conclusion is largely positive. Demand policies
cannot lower the equilibrium level of stock, although they will encourage faster
destruction of a fishery when the equilibrium stock is zero.
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x.
Maple Appendix
The two most relevant Maple documents were included. This first document was used to
derive the system of equations:

> # Andre GarroD
> # Model 6 derivation
> # equations where:
> # g only refers to a part of x
> # mts is changed to lbs
> # time is changed to 1 week
> # C-D utility function
> # n is linearly endogenous
> # 4128/04
> restart;
> with(DEtools):with(linalg):with(pJots):
> # Units of measure
> # F(x): growth of fish stock in lbs
> # hex): harvest of fish in lbs
> # r: rate of change of fish stock due to births and deaths per week
> # x: Ibs of fish in ocean
> # k: max stock offish in lbs
> # p: price of fish
> # a: in demand equation
> # b: in demand equation
> # Q: totallbs of fish harvested by the industry
> # n: number of fishermen
> # q: lbs of fish harvested per boat
> # U: utility
> # Y: income
> # L: hours of leisure per week
> # TR: Total revenue per week
> # TC: Total costs per week
> # w: hours worked per week
> # f: marginal costs per hour
> # II: fixed costs per week
> # g: percent of available stock caught in one week
> # u: percent ofx on which g relies
> # cd: efficiency parmeter in C-D utility function
> # cJ: elasticity of utility with respect to leisure
> # cy: elasticity of utility with respect to income
> # j 1: number of ships at economic profits
> # j2: propensity of ships to enter or leave industry
> eql :=diff(x(t),t)=F(x(t»-h(x(t»;
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> F I :=r·x(t)*( l-(x(t)/k»;
> eq2:=p(t)=a-b*Q(t);
> Ql:=n*q;
> 01 :=j 1+j2{Y);
> VI :=cd*YA(cy)*LA(cl);
> YI :=TR-TC;
> TRI :=q.p(t);
> TCI :=w*f+II;
> q ~ :=g*x(t)*w*u;
> TR2:=subs(q=qI,TR.l);
> Y2:=subs(TR=TR2,TC=TCI,Yl);
> n2:=subs(Y=Y2,nI);
> Q2:=sabs(n=n2,Ql);
> L1:=168-w;
> U2:=subs(Y=Y2,L=LI,Ul);
> dU:=diff(U2,w);
> wi :=solve(dU=O,w);
.> q2:=subs(w=w1 ,q I);
> Q3:=subs(q=q2,Q2);
> Q4:=subs(w=w['Q3);
> eq3 :=diff(x(t),t)=F l-Q4;
> eq4:=subs(Q(t)=Q4,eq2);
> eq6:=simplify(eq4);
> eq7:=(Ibs(eq4)*denom(rhs(eq4»=numer(rhs(eq4»);
> eq8:=diff(eq7,t);
> eq9:=diff(p(t),t)=solve(eq8,diff(p(t),t»;
> # System of Equations
>eq3;
> eq9;
> delp:=subs(x(t)=x,p(t)=p,eq9);
> de1x:=suhs(x(t)=X,p(t)=p,eq3);
> # fonnula for w given an x and p:
> wl;
> # formula for !'1 at these points is:
> eq 14 :=n=j 1+j!2(g*xCt)·w*u*p(t)-w· f- II);
> # total revenue formula
> eq15 :-tr~g*x(t)*w*u*p(t);
> # total cost formula
> eq I 6: =tc=w.f+Il;
> # equation for Q
> Q2:= GI +j,2(g*x(t)*w*u*p(t)-w*f-II)*Cg·x(t)*w*u);
> Q3:=Q=subs(w=w1 ,Q2);
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This second document is used to determine the nullclines, equilibrium, analyze dynamic
shocks to the system, and graph the phase plane:

> # Andre Garron
> # Model 6 Analysis
> # g is a part of x
> # mts is changed to Ibs
> # time is in weeks
> # Cobb Douglas utility function
> # n is endogenous (linear)
> # 4/28/04
> restart;
> with(plots):with(DEtools):
> delp:=-g*u*delx*(-[ 68*b*j [ *cy"2*f+cl*b*j 1*II*cy+cl"2*b*j 1*11
168*cl*b*j l*cy* f+cl"2 *b*j2(( I68*g*x*u*p-168*f-II)*cy/(cy+cl)*I1
I 68*el·b*j2«(.l68*g*x*u*p-168* f-II)*cy/(cy+cl»·cy*f-168*b*j2«(168*g*x*u*p-168*f
II)*cy/(cy+d»"'cy"2*f+cl*b*j2«(I68*g*x*u*p-168*f
1])*cy/(cy+d»*II*cy+pA 2*cyA2+pA 2*cl"2-p*a*cy"2-p*a*c\"2
2 *p*a*cy*c1+2*p"2·cy*cl+336-*p*x*g*u*cl*b*j I*cy+336*p*x*g*u*b*j 1·cy"2
28224*p*x*g*u*b*ID(j2)«(l68,* g*x*u*p-168*f
ll)*cy/(cy+c1»*cy"2'" f+28224·p"2*x"2*g"2*u"2*b*D(j2)((168* g*x·u*p-168*f
Il)*cy/(cy+cl)*cy"2+ 168*p*x*g*u*d*b*D(j2)« 168*g·x*u*p-16S*f
~I)*cy/(cy+cl»·cy*n+
3 36*p*x*g*u*b*j2«(l68*g*x*u*p-168*f
- n)*cy/(cy+cl»*cy"2+336*p*x*g*u*cl"b*j2«(l68*g*x *u +p-168 +f-II)*cy/(cy+c1»*cy)/(
cy"2*f-cl"2*f
x*g*u*a*cl"2+] 68*x"2+g"2*u"2*cl*b*j 1*cy+168*x"2*g"2*u"2*cl*b*D(j2)« 168*g*x
·u*p~]68*f~1l)·cy/(cy+c1»)*cy*II+168*x"2*g"2*u"2*b*j2« 168*g*x+u*p-168*f
II)*cy/( cy+cl»"'cy"2-28224*x"2 • g"2 *u"2*b*D(j2)« 168*g*x +u+p-168*f
II)*cy/(cy+c1»*cy"2*f
2 *x*g*u*a*cy*cl+168*x"2'"g"2 *uI\2*b*j 1*cyA 2+ 168*xI\2· g"2 *u"2+c1*b*j2«168 *g*x*
u*p-I 68* f-II) *cy/(cy+d))*cy
x· g*u*a*cy"2+28224·p*g"J*u"3 *b*iD(j2)« 168*g*x·u*Jr168 *f
II)*cy/(cy-td»*cy"2*x"3+4*p*x"g*u*cl*cy+2*p*x*g*u*cy"2+2*p*x*g*u*cl"2
2*c1*cy*f);
> delx:=r*x *(l-x/k)-(j 1+j2(g*x·( 168*cy*g*x*u*p-168*cy*f+cl*II)*u*p/( cy* g*x*u*p
cy*f+cl* g*x*u*p-cl *f)-( 16S*cy*g*x''''u*p-168*cy*f+cl*II)*fI(cy*g*x*u*p
cy* f+cl* g*x*u*p-cl *t)-II)*g*x*(16S*cy*g*x*u*p-16S*cy*f+cl·lI)*uI(cy* g*x*u*p
cy·f+cl* g*x*u··p-cl *t);
> delxs:=factor{simplify(delx»;
> delps:=factor(simplify(delp»;
> # Parameters
> # nice parameters
>#£0:= 1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.0000641 O;aO:=l. 7064;£0:=.33 ;kO:= 132300000;uO:=
1;cdO:=l ;clO:= 1;cyO:=1J 10:= IOO;j20:=O;xm.in:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;prange:=
2;
> #excellent- no sigificant change
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> # j2not equal to 0
>#fO:=l ;bO:=.00000002;TIO:=7;gO:=.0000641 O;aO:=I. 7064;rO:=.33 ;kO:=132300000;uO:=
1;cdO:= 1;c10:= 1;cyO:=I;j 10:=100;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;pran
ge:=2;
> # newly derived parameters
>fO:=I;bO:=.00000002;IlO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.01269;kO:=132300000;uO:
=1;cdO:= 1;clO:= 1;cyO:=l;j 10:=1OO;j20:=.OOO1;xmin:=0;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;pra
nge:=2;
> # basic new diagram- which is nice b/c x can increase
>
> # new parameters wilth a short range
>#fO:= 1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:= I. 7064;rO:=.O 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:=1 ;cdO:=1 ;dO:=l ;cyO:,=l;j to:=100;j2'O:=.OOO 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=1.01e+08;pra
nge.::;;;:;.l ;
> # looks consistent, but note the orange line to the left of the vertical equilibria
> # increase f
>#fO:= I O;bO:=,00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.01269;kO:=132300000;
uO:=] ;cdO:= 1;c10:= 1;cyO:= l;j] 0:=] OO;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=0~ge:=200000000;
prange: =2;
> # the blue c'urve moves up and becomes relevant
>
> # decrease f
>#fO:o;;;.] ;bO:~.00000002;nO:=7;gO:=.'OOOOOOJ8;aO:=1. 7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:= I ;cdO:= 1;clO:= 1;cyO:= I j 10:=1OOj20:=.OOOt ;x.min:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;p
range:=2;
> # the blue' curve becomes very irrelevant and the cures flatten
>

> # increase b
>#fO:=1 ;hO:=.0000002;1l0:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.01269;kO:= 132300000;uO:
= I;cdO:= I ;cJI0:= I ;cyO:= I ;j 10:=100;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;pra
nge:;;;;;2;
> # noiliiin much
>
> # decrease b
>#fO:=1;bO:=.000000002;nO :=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rll:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;
uO:=1 ;cdO:'=1 ;clO:=] ;cyO:=l j 10:=1 OO;j20:=.0001 ;x.min:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # nothin much
>
> # increase II
>#fO:= 1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=70;gO:=.00000038;aO:= 1.7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;
uO:= I ;cdO:= 1;c10:= 1;cyO:=l;j 10:=1 00;j20:=.0001;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # cyan line goes away?
>
> # decrease II
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>#fO:=l ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=.7;gO:=.0000003 8;aO:= 1.7064;t{):=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:=1 ;cdO:= 1;clO:= I;cyO:= 1;j 10:= 100;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;p
range: =2;
> # no real change
>
> # increase g
>#fO:= I ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;uO:
=1 ;cdO:= 1;c10:= 1;cyO:= 1J10:=1 OO;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;pra
nge:=2;
> # becomes the precursorto ourfonner swirl(the no swirl) but then becomes the swirl if
increased by a factor of 100
>

> # decrease g
>#fO:=l ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.000000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;
uO:=1;cdO:=l ;c10:=1;cyO:= I;j I0:= 100;j20:=.0001 ;x.min:=O;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # similar to if i raised f
>

> # increase a
>#£0:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=17.064;1'0:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:=1 ;cdO:=l ;clO:=l ;cyO:=I;j 1O:=100;j20:=.OOOl ;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;p
range:=2;
> # only blue line seems to become relevant
>
> # decrease a
>#fO:= 1;bO:=.00000002;110 :=7;gO:::::.00000038;aO:=.17064;t{):=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:=1;cdO:= I;clO:= 1;cyO:= I ;j 10:=100J20:=.000 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;p
range:=2;
> # the other cmves dip so low that again only blue is relevant
>
> # increase r
>#fO:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;g{):=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=. 1269;kO:=1 32300000;uO:
=1;000:= I;clO:=1 ;cyO:= l;j 10:=100;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;pra
nge:=2;
> # verticle equilibrium moves right
>
> # decrease r
>#£O:=1;bO:=.00000002;TlO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;t{):=.001269;kO:=132300000;
uO:=l ;cdO:=l ;clO:=1 ;cyO:=I;j I0:=100;j20:=.0001 ;xmin:=0;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # no visible verticle equilibrium. prob moved left too far.
>
> # increase cd
>#£0:=1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:= I.7064;rO:=.0] 269;kO:= 132300000;u
0:= I;cdO:= 1O;clO:= 1;cyO:=l ;j I0:= I00;j20:=.OOO1;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;

52

> # no real effect
>
> # decrease cd
>#£0:=1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;g{):=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rl>:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:= I;cdO:=.1 ;cIO:=l ;cyO:=1J I0:= IOOJ20:=.0001;xmin:=0;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # no real effect
>
> # increase cl
>#fO:= 1;bO:=.00000002;11O:=7;gO:=.0000003 8;aO:=1.7064;rl>:=.01269;kO:= 132300000;u
0:= I ;cdO:= 1;clO:= 1O;cyO:= 1;j 10:=1OO;j20:=.000 1;xmin:=O;prnin:=0;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # verticle line moves right
>
> # decrease cl
>#fO:=1;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=I.7064;rl>:=.0 1269;kO:= 132300000;u
0:= I ;cdO:= I ;clO:=.1 ;cyO:= l;j 10:=1OO;j20:=.OOO 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # verticle line moves left
>
> # increase cy
>#£0:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;g{):=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rl>:=.OI269;kO:=132300000;u
0:=1 ;cdO:=1 ;clO:=1 ;cyO:=1 OJ 10:=1 OOj20:=.OOO I ;xmin:=0;prnin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # verticle line moves left
>
>
> # decrease cy
>#fO:=l ;bO:=.00000002;110:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:= 1. 7064;rl>:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:= 1;cdO:= 1;clO:= 1;cyO:=.l;j 10:= 100;j20:=.OOO 1;xmin:=0;prnin:=Q;xrange:=200000000;
prange: =2;
> # veticle line moves right
> # cy,cl=.5
>#fO:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rt:l:=.01269;kO:=132300000;u
0:= 1;cdO:= l;clO:=.5 ;cyO:=.5;j 10:=1OOj20:=.OOO 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # looks like original
>
> # cy=.25,cy=.25
>#£0:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;I10:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rt:l:=.0 1269;kO:=132300000;u
0:= I;cdO:= 1;clO:=.25;cyO:=.25 j 10:= I00j20:=.OOO I;xmin:=O;pmin:=O;xrange:=2000000
OO;prange:=2;
> # looks about like original
>
> # increase j2
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>#fO:=1 ;bO:=.00000002;IIO:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:= I.7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:= 132300000;u
0:= I ;cdO:= I ;c10:= 1;cyO:=1;j 10:= 100;j20:=.00 1;xmin:=0;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;pr
ange:=2;
> # nothin really
>
> # decrease j2
>#fO:=] ;bO:=.00000002;1l0:=7;gO:=.00000038;aO:=1.7064;rO:=.0 1269;kO:= 132300000;u
O:=l;cdO:=l ;ciO:=l ;cyO:=I;j 10:=1 OOj20:=.OOOO 1;xmin:=O;pmin:=0;xrange:=200000000;
prange:=2;
> # no thin really

>
> # substitute parameters
>delxO:=subs(f=fO,b=bO,Il=IIO,g=gO,a=aO,r=rO,k=kO,u=uO,cd=cdO,cl=clO,cy=cyOJ 1=j 10,
j2=j20,delxs);
>delpO:=subs(f=fO,b=bO,II=IIO,g=gO,a=aO,r=rOJ<.=kO,u=uO,cd=cdO,cl=c10,cy=cyOj I=j 10,
j2"'=j20,delps);
> # solve for p
> delx I:=solve(delxO"'=O,p);
> delp 1:=solve(delpO==O,p);
> infx:=solve(denom(delxO)=O,p);
> infp:=solve(denom(delpO)=O,p);
>phaseO:=<Ifieldplot([diff(x(t),t)=delxO,diff(p(t),t)=delpO],[x(t),p(t)], t=0 ..5,x=xmin..xrang
e, p=pmin..prange,arrows=slim):
> delx 1p:=plot(delx 1,x=xmin..xrange,y=pmin..prange,color=blue):
> delp Iap:=plot(delp 1[1 ],x=xmin..xrange,y=pmin..prange,color=magenta):
> delpl bp:=plot(delpl [2],x=xmin ..xrange,y=pmin..prange,color=green):
> # note: delp 1cp is not plotted because it equals delx Ip
> infxp: =plot(infX,x=xm in..xrange,y=pmin..prange,color=orange):
> # note: infpap is not plotted because it equals infxp
> infpbp:=plot(infp[2],x=xmin..xrange,y=pmin..prange,color=cyan):
> # idea: also include x values that make sqr rts impossible for delps
> display(phaseO,delx Ip,delp 1ap,delp1bp,infxp,infpbp);
> # Line A1 analysis
> xO:=6e+07:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,delp 1[1]);
> PlineA 1:=subs(x=xO, p--pO, delpO);
> XlineAI :=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delxO);
> # Line A2 analysis
> xO:= 1.2e+08:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,delpl [1]);
> PlineA2:=subs(x=xO, p=p0, del pO);
> XlineA2:=subs(x=xO,p--pO,delxO);
> # Line B I analysis
> xO:=6e+07:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,P=P0' infp{2]);
> PlineB 1:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delpO);
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Error, division by zero
> XlineB 1:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delxO);
> # Line B2 analysis
> xO:=1.2e+08:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,infp[2]);
> PiineB2 :=subs(x=xO~p=pO,delpO);
Error, division by zero
> Xl ineB2:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,deIxO);
> # Line C 1 Analysis
> xO:=6e+07:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,delx I);
> PlineC 1:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delpO);
> XlineC 1:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delxO);
> # Line C2 Analysis
> xO:=1.2e+08:
> pO:=subs(x=xO,delx1);
> PiineC2 :=subs(x=xO,p=pO,delpO);
> XlineC2:=subs(x=xO,p=pO,deJxO);
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